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INTRODUCTION

A recent topic of vigorous debate in the federal courts is the viability of
sexual harassment claims that involve victims and harassers of the same sex.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits sexual
harassment in the workplace.' Historically, both men and women have been
entitled to bring sexual harassment claims.2 Traditional cases of sexual
harassment involved male harassers and female victims and thus, were easily
decided according to the language of Title VII. 3 However, recent cases have
arisen involving harassers and victims of the same sex.' Because the
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the viability of such claims, federal case
law on the issue has developed in an inconsistent and thereby, inconclusive
manner.
Recent trends in the case law are indicative of the problems that have
arisen due to a lack of legislative history for the provisions of Title VII
relevant in sexual harassment cases. With little notice of legislative intent to
guide them, contemporary courts have struggled to discern the boundaries of
Title VII in sexual harassment law. As a result, many courts have fallen
astray, reaching inconsistent and illogical conclusions based upon factors that
are, or should be, irrelevant to Title VII analysis of a particular claim.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the conflicting approaches of
contemporary courts in order to discern the correct approach to Title VII
sexual harassment analysis and to predict future court action. Part II of this
Note discusses the legislative history of Title VII, the inception of sexual
harassment claims under Title VII, and the traditional approach of courts in
handling these claims. Part III outlines the history of same-sex claims under
Title VII, including the position of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and special problems encountered by courts in the
analysis of same-sex claims.
Part IV presents the current state of the law for same-sex harassment
under Title VII. This part examines the current federal court split, placing
particular emphasis on the most recent approaches of the highest federal
courts. Part V looks toward the future of same-sex claims in an attempt to
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
2. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (explaining that

the congressional intent behind Title VII was to eliminate differential treatment between men
and women).
3. See, e.g., id. at 60 (ruling specifically on the issue of sexual harassment involving a
male harasser and female victim); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.

1995) (stating that "the concept of sexual harassment is designed to protect working women
from the kind of male attentions that can make the workplace hellish for women").
4. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 64; Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310

(N.D. Ill. 1981).
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discern a trend among federal courts. This part critiques the most recent
federal court positions and proposes a more equitable and sound analysis for
same-sex harassment claims. Finally, this Note concludes by predicting that
if and when the Supreme Court confronts this issue, it is most likely that the
Court will allow same-sex claims under Title VII.

II. HISTORY OF TITLE VII CLAIMS
A.

litle VII Generally

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's... sex."' The Act
applies to employers, their agents, labor organizations, and employment
agencies6 and has been interpreted to supply a cause of action for both men
and women.7 It has been generally accepted that the purpose of Title VII
was to alleviate racial discrimination
However, there is an absence of
legislative history regarding the addition of the term "sex" to Title VII, which
otherwise prohibits discrimination on the basis of race and national origin.9
In fact, the term "sex" was added in a hasty and ambiguous manner when
Title VII was on the floor of the House of Representatives just before its
enactment.' 0
Several commentators have suggested that the inclusion of the term "sex"
was proposed by opponents of the Civil Rights Act in an attempt to thwart
its success." Allegedly, these opponents thereby sought to highlight the

5: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
6. See id. § 2000e-2; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1995).
7. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 64.
8. See 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964) (statement of Rep. Green, opposing addition of the
term "sex") ("Whether we want to admit it or not, the main purpose of this legislation today
is to try to help end the discrimination that has been practiced against Negroes.").
9. See, e.g., Meritor,477 U.S. at 63-64 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964)); Quick
v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1381 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996) (Nangle, J., dissenting). For further
information regarding the legislative history of Title VII, see generally CHARLES WHALEN &
BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

1964

CIVIL

RIGHTS AcT (1985).

10. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63 (citing 110 CONG. REC. at 2577-84); see also Ellen
Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassmentas Sex Discrimination:A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L.

& POL'Y REV. 333, 346 (1990) (stating that the term was added at the eleventh hour and
received no relevant discussion). Paul further highlights the brevity of discussion given the
addition by stating that "members of Congress would have been quite surprised to learn that
they had contemplated including sexual harassment within the confines of sex discrimination."
Id.

11. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 816-17 (1991) ("[I]ts
proponents included a number of Congressmen opposed to the Act, who hoped that the
inclusion of 'sex' would highlight the absurdity of the effort as a whole, and contribute to its
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absurdity of the Civil Rights Act as a whole. 2 In fact, some have criticized
that the addition may have been racially motivated by a group of opponents
seeking protection for only white women rather than all women. 3 Because
the term "sex" was a last-minute addition to Title VII, there was little
discussion of the term's meaning in this context, and the Civil Rights Act
was swiftly passed. 14 As a result, the meaning of the term "sex" has been
hotly5 debated in the federal courts as the judiciary has interpreted Title
1
VII.
B.

Viable Sexual Harassment Claims

The United States Supreme Court first decided in Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson' 6 that sexual harassment may form the basis of a Title VII
sex discrimination claim.' 7 The Meritor Court stated that a Title VII sexual
harassment claim may be based on one of two theories of liability: (1)
"harassment that involves the conditioning of employment benefits on sexual
favors, and (2) harassment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates
a hostile or offensive working environment.""i
As one commentator has noted, the scope of the Meritor case itself was
narrow in that it involved the traditional category of harassment perpetrated
by a male harasser against a female victim. 19 However, the Meritor ruling
significantly broadened the scope of Title VII protection by allowing
recovery for noneconomic harm. 20
Pre-Meritor decisions involved a
traditional quid pro quo sexual harassment analysis where the affected
employee was required to demonstrate a tangible loss of employment

defeat.") (footnote omitted).
12. See id.
13. See supra text accompanying note 8; see also Developments in the Law Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1109, 1166-67 (1970-1971).
14. See generally WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 9; see also Kristi J.Johnson,
Comment, Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corporation: What Does It Mean to Be Harassed
"Because of" Your Sex?: Sexual Stereotyping and the "Bisexual" Harasser Revisited, 79
IOWA L. REv. 731, 735-36 (1994) (discussing the hasty addition of the term "sex" by
opponents of the Act).
15. For additional discussion of this issue, see Lisa Wehren, Note, Same-Gender Sexual
HarassmentUnder Title VII: Garcia v. Elf Atochem Marks a Step in the Wrong Direction, 32
CAL. W.L. REv. 87, 91-93 (1995).
16. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
17. Id. at 66.
18. Id. at 57.
19. Renee Levay, Comment, Employment Law - Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Walden Book Co.: Does/Should Title VII Apply to Same-Gender Sexual
Harassment?, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1601, 1607 (1996).
20. Id.
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benefits." Meritor would potentially allow recovery for psychological and
emotional harm, as well as economic harm."2
1. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
Quid pro quo sexual harassment is the traditional paradigm for sexual
harassment claims. This theory of liability requires the plaintiff to establish
that sexual favors were required in return for tangible employment benefits,
such as raises or promotions.23 It also has been suggested that a plaintiff
must show that adverse employment consequences followed a failure to
submit to the request for sexual favors.24
Several factors need to be demonstrated to recover under a quid pro quo
theory of liability: (1) the plaintiff/employee must belong to a protected
group; (2) the plaintiff must have been subjected to unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) the harassment must have been "based on sex"; and (4) the
harassment must have altered the terms and conditions of employment.25
2.

Hostile or Offensive Work Environment

A second theory of liability for potential plaintiffs is the hostile or
offensive work environment sexual harassment claim. There are five
elements of a hostile or offensive work environment claim.26 First, the
27
employee must demonstrate that he or she belongs to a protected group.
Second, the employee must show that he or she was subjected to unwelcome
sexual harassment. 2' This unwelcome harassment may take the form of
"sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature." 29 Third, the harassment must have been "based
on sex." 30 Fourth, the harassment must have had the effect of unreasonably
interfering with the plaintiff's work performance and creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment. 31 Lastly, the employee must
21. Id. at 1608-09; see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (explaining the relevant factors in
traditional quid pro quo analysis).

22. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66 (recognizing that sexual harassment victims may be

protected against psychological and emotional harm as well as pure economic harm).
23. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982).
24. See Bradley Golden, Note, Harris v. Forklift: The Supreme Court Takes One Step
Forwardand Two Steps Back on the Issue of Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment,
1994 DET. C.L. REV. 1151, 1160.
25. Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1549 (M.D. Ala.
1995).
26. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 904.
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demonstrate that the employer knew or should have known about the
harassment and failed to take action to prevent the negative behavior.32 The
first three factors match those required for a showing of quid pro quo
harassment. However, for a showing of hostile work environment, the
plaintiff must prove employer liability in addition33to demonstrating the
creation of a hostile or offensive work environment.
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,4 the Supreme Court elaborated on
the correct analysis of a hostile work environment claim. The HarrisCourt
stated that the trier of fact must examine the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether a hostile or abusive work environment exists.3" The
Court contrasted a mere offensive utterance with the type of severe and
frequent discriminatory behavior, involving physical threats or humiliation,
that would likely constitute an offensive or hostile work environment.36
Other courts have further concluded that an actionable claim based on a
hostile work environment theory need not involve conduct that is explicitly
37
sexual in nature, but need only be motivated by gender-based animus.
Courts have traditionally applied the same elements for a prima facie case
of sexual harassment, but have disagreed as to what constitutes "based on
sex" under the third element, and who is a member of a protected class under
the first element.38 Due to a lack of clear legislative intent for inclusion of
the term "sex" in Title VII, 39 courts have been free to disagree and apply
Title VII in an inconsistent and unpredictable manner. This inconsistency
has left the issue of same-sex harassment undetermined and as some might
argue, unpredictable.4"

32. Id. at 905.
33. Id. at 910.
34. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
35. Id. at 23.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (relying on
earlier case law to adopt a broad interpretation of Title VII that allows for recognition of
aggressive acts not explicitly sexual in nature); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406,
1415 (10th Cir. 1987) (concluding that conduct may constitute sexual harassment under a
hostile work environment theory even if the acts are not sexual in nature). For further
discussion, see also Trish K. Murphy, Note & Comment, Without Distinction: Recognizing
Coverage of Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1125, 1129
(1995).
38. See Elizabeth Pryor Johnson & Michael A. Puchades, Same-Gender Sexual
Harassment: But Is It DiscriminationBased on Sex?, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1995, at 79.
39. See 110 CONG. REc. 2581 (1964); Estrich, supra note 11, at 816-17.
40. See, e.g., Levay, supra note 19, at 1629 (expressing the need for congressional action
to clarify the ambiguous nature of Title VII and highlighting the problems courts have
experienced fitting sexual harassment into a sex discrimination framework).
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THE INCEPTION OF SAME-SEX HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII

Armed with less than satisfactory EEOC guidelines and scant indication
of legislative intent, courts have struggled in their search for a consistent
interpretation of the term "sex" in Title VII. 41 Particularly problematic have
been Title VII claims involving bisexual harassers or homosexual victims.42
Many courts have interpreted and followed EEOC guidelines in holding that
Title VII does not apply to discrimination based on sexual preference.4 3
However, others have developed a competing interpretation of Title
VII's
44
"based on sex" language to allow claims by homosexual victims.
A.

The EEOC Position

The EEOC clearly asserts that same-sex harassment could constitute a
viable Title VII claim. 45 According to the EEOC Compliance Manual:
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the
harasser. Since sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination,
the crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a member or
members of one sex differently from members of the other sex. The
victim and the harasser may be of the same sex where, for instance,
the sexual harassment is based on the victim's sex (not on the
victim's sexual preference) and the harasser does not treat employees
of the opposite sex the same way. 46
Significantly, the EEOC makes an exception for harassment based on
sexual preference. 47 In this vein, the EEOC has stated, "If a male supervisor harasses a male employee because of the employee's homosexuality, then
the supervisor's conduct would not be sexual harassment, since it is based on
the employee's sexual preference, not on his gender., 48 In other words, the

41. See Wehren, supra note 15, at 122 (arguing that the "but for" test has failed to
recognize the entire spectrum of sexual harassment scenarios, thereby resulting in inconsistent
and poorly reasoned opinions); see also Johnson & Puchades, supra note 38, at 80.
42. See Wehren, supra note 15, at 122.
43. See id. at 105-06 (arguing that courts have concluded that Title VII prohibits sexual
harassment by homosexuals, but it does not prohibit harassment against homosexuals).
44. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251-52 (1989) (interpreting the
term "sex" to include acting on the basis of sex stereotypes to allow same-sex harassment
claims under Title VII).
45. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 615.2(b)(3), at
130 (1987).
46. Id.
47. See id. at ex.2.
48. Id.
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position of the EEOC is that sex discrimination against homosexuals is not
actionable per se, but same-sex discrimination is actionable if members of
one sex are treated differently than members of the other sex.49 Some
commentators have criticized this result as requiring employers to make
overly fine distinctions regarding an employee's motives when addressing
these types of complaints in the workplace.50
B.

Special Problems Concerning Bisexual Harassersand
Homosexual ictims

Courts have traditionally applied a "but for" analysis to the examination
of Title VII claims.5 ' When viewing the plaintiff's argument, courts
commonly have inquired whether the discrimination or harassment would
have taken place but for the victim's sex. 2 This "but for" determination
provides a mode of analysis for the "based on sex" requirement for both quid
pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims. With no
legislative history indicating the intended
meaning of the term "sex," courts
53
have interpreted "sex" to mean gender.
The first case allowing a claim for same-sex harassment under Title VII,
Wright v. Methodist Youth Services,54 involved a quid pro quo action
brought by a male plaintiff claiming harassment by a male supervisor."
The Wright plaintiff alleged that his male supervisor fired him for failing to
respond to his supervisor's overt sexual advances.5 6 The Wright court
applied a "but for" analysis in determining that the harassing conduct was
based on the employee's gender because it constituted an alleged demand that
would not be directed to a female.57

49. See Johnson & Puchades, supra note 38, at 80.
50. See id.
51. Johnson, supra note 14, at 738.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-41 (1989) (using gender
and sex interchangeably); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir.
1996) (stating that there is no need to distinguish sex and gender in Title VII cases).
54. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
55. Id. at 309-10.
56. Id.
57. Id. The application of the "but for" test in Wright has been analyzed by some as
follows:
[I]n Wright ... the court adopted a "but for" test, holding that a cause of action
arises where the individual would not have been harassed but for his or her sex.
However, in these early cases the courts did not seem to recognize a cause
of action for sexual harassment in and of itself. The prohibited activity was still
gender discrimination, which would include harassment on the basis of gender, as
opposed to all harassment that was sexual in nature.
Megan P. Norris & Mark A. Randon, Sexual Orientation and the Workplace: Recent
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Application of a traditional "but for" analysis has proven problematic for
courts in the context of harassment by homosexual or bisexual harassers. 8
In reaction to this problem, courts have either denied protection altogether or
reframed the analysis conducted to reach an equitable and correct conclusion
in the eyes of the court.5 9 Early decisions consistently accepted same-sex
discrimination as a viable cause of action under Title VII. 60 However, a
trend toward disallowing same-sex claims involving bisexual
harassers or
6
homosexual victims has been amplified in recent case law. '

1. Bisexual Harassers
Courts have experienced considerable difficulty in applying the traditional
"but for" analysis to cases involving bisexual harassers. 62 In this "but for"
analysis, courts question whether an employee would have been harassed
"but for" his or her sex. 63 In other words, courts inquire whether a victim's
harassment was based on the victim's gender.' Almost universally, the
indication has been that cases involving bisexual harassers will inherently fail

Developments in Discrimination and Harassment Law, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 233, 236
(1993).
58. Wehren, supra note 15, at 122 (arguing that the "but for" test has failed to recognize
the entire spectrum of sexual harassment scenarios, thereby resulting in inconsistent and poorly
reasoned opinions).
59. See, e.g., Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136-37 (C.D. Ill.
1995) (negating the proposition that a male plaintiff must demonstrate an anti-male work
environment to state a claim under Title VII, and reasoning that same-sex harassment is
invalid under Title VII based upon a plain-language reading of the statute); EEOC v. Walden
Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103-04 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (holding that "[w]hen a homosexual supervisor is making offensive sexual advances to a subordinate of the same sex, and not
doing so to employees of the opposite sex, it absolutely is a situation where, but for the
subordinate's sex, he would not be subjected to that treatment").
60. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating in dicta that
same-gender sexual advances could give rise to a sexual harassment claim).
61. See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (refusing to recognize a
same-sex claim because the harassing conduct was motivated by the victim's sexual
preference, not gender); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (refusing
to allow same-sex harassment claims brought against bisexual harassers); Vandeventer v.
Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (concluding that people who are
harassed because they are homosexual or are perceived as homosexual are not protected by
Title VII).
62. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982) (stating that sexual
harassment is not based on sex when men and women are afforded like treatment); Barnes,
561 F.2d at 990 n.55 (allowing that there are cases that would fail the "but for" test because
sexual overtures are made to both sexes or conduct complained of is equally offensive to both
male and female workers).
63. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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the "but for" test. 65 Even courts that accept same-sex discrimination claims
involving homosexual harassers refuse to allow similar claims involving
bisexual harassers.66 Because bisexual harassers would presumably direct
sexually harassing comments or demands to members of either or both sexes,
victims still may have been harassed "but for" their gender.67 As a result,
courts have reasoned that the "but for" test justifies judgment for the
employer/defendant because the "based on sex" factor has not been met.68
2.

Homosexual Victims

A similar trend has recently developed in cases where homosexuals
allege sexual harassment by members of the same sex.69 Decisions refusing
to allow a same-sex harassment claim where the victim is homosexual
comport with the stated intention of the EEOC. In its interpretation of Title
VII, the EEOC stated that Title VII only protects against discrimination based
on gender, not against discrimination based on sexual preference. 70 This
stated EEOC policy reflects the treatment of the term "sex" by interpreting
courts. These courts have consistently interpreted "sex" to mean gender and
not sexual preference. 7' Therefore, these courts have reasoned that a cause
of action for same-sex discrimination will only be permitted if7the
"but for"
2
test demonstrates that the discrimination was based on gender.
65. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942 n.7 (stating that "[o]nly by a reductio ad absurdum could we
imagine a case of harassment that is not sex discrimination - where a bisexual supervisor
harasses men and women alike") (citation omitted).
66. See, e.g., Barnes v Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (1977) (allowing Title VII claims
brought by homosexuals and stating that only harassment perpetuated by bisexuals is beyond
Title VII coverage); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.
Ga. 1995) (recognizing a same-sex harassment claim involving homosexual advances but
reasoning that bisexual advances would not be allowable under Title VII).
67. See supra notes 58 & 61 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 58 & 61 and accompanying text.
69. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977)
(refusing to interpret "sex" beyond its traditional meaning based on the argument that
Congress did not intend to protect against sexual preference discrimination in drafting Title
VII); Kelley v. Vaughn, 760 F. Supp. 161, 163 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (concluding that the term
"sex" in Title VII refers to gender discrimination, not sexual preference discrimination). For
further discussion of the treatment of same-sex harassment claims involving homosexual
victims, see Wehren, supra note 15, at 105-06 (arguing that courts have concluded that Title
VII prohibits homosexual sexual harassment, but does not prohibit harassment against
homosexuals).
70. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
71. See Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 1990 WL 165611, at *7 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
16, 1990) (limiting Title VII to the prohibition of discrimination based on gender); Hopkins
v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 833 n.19 (D. Md. 1994) (stating that courts
have traditionally interpreted the term "sex" to mean gender).
72. See supra notes 58 & 67 and accompanying text; see also Wehren, supra note 15, at
105 (arguing that "[i]nstead of recognizing that sexual harassment in the form of attacks
against the victim's actual or perceived sexual orientation is discrimination based on gender,
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These courts have concurrently stated that the "but for" test will not be
satisfied if the discriminatory action is based on the victim's sexual
preference. 73 As a result, these courts consistently hold that sexual
preference discrimination is beyond the purview of Title VII .7 The conflict
between courts allowing same-sex claims for homosexual victims and those
disallowing such claims is based solely75 on differences in the interpretation
of the term "sex" as used in Title VII.

IV.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: THE FEDERAL COURT SPLIT

As suggested by some commentators, 76 Courts have traditionally
accepted same-sex harassment as a viable claim under Title VII.77 Howev-78
er, in 1994, the Fifth Circuit in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America
ignited a trend that prompted other federal circuit courts of appeals and
several federal district courts to refuse to honor same-sex Title VII claims.79
Some critics believed a Garcia-type analysis would lead federal courts, and
ultimately the Supreme Court, to find same-sex harassment unactionable
under Title VII. 80 However, case law subsequent to Garcia has called this
prediction into question by developing a competing analysis in favor of
same-sex harassment as a Title VII claim.81
A.

Courts Refusing to Allow Same-Sex Claims

The Fifth Circuit was the first federal circuit court of appeals to rule on
the issue of same-sex harassment under Title VII. 82 The Fifth Circuit's
1994 decision in Garcia sent a resounding message to other federal courts,

courts have characterized such conduct as non-actionable sexual orientation discrimination").
73. See cases cited supra note 61; see also Paula L. Ettelbrick, Not All Speech Is Equal:
Some Thoughts on Lesbians,Free Speech and Harassment,3 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV.
59, 65 (1994) (stating that "[w]hen a gay employee is involved, regardless of the form or type
of harassment, the court usually concludes that the case is a gay case, not a sexual harassment
case, and rejects the claim"); Wehren, supra note 15, at 93-95 (referring to the significance

of judicial interpretations of the phrase "because of sex").
74. See cases cited supra note 61; Wehren, supra note 15, at 87-93.
75. Compare Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977)

(refusing to interpret the term "sex" to incorporate sexual preference discrimination), with
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251-52 (1989) (interpreting the term "sex" to
include acting on the basis of sex stereotypes to allow same-sex harassment claims under Title
VII).
76. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 37.
77. Id.

78.
79.
80.
81.

28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
See Levay, supra note 19, at 1631.
See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1372.

82. See Wehren, supra note 15, at 115-21 (discussing at length the impact of Garciaon

the current state of the law).
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both within and outside the circuit, that the acceptance of same-sex
harassment as a valid Title VII claim undermines the congressional intent
behind the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.83 In fact, several
commentators believed that the influential Garcia opinion would create a
trend in federal courts in favor of denying same-sex harassment claims.4
1. Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America
Like many other same-sex harassment cases, Garciainvolved review of
a summary judgment decision in favor of the defendant employer.8 5 In
Garcia, a male plaintiff charged his male supervisor with sexual harassment
in violation of Title VII. 86 In a quick disposition of Garcia's sexual
harassment claim, the court summarily stated that "' [h]arassment by a male
supervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII
even though the harassment has sexual overtones."' 87 Relying upon a lower
district court ruling, the Garciacourt further stated that "Title VII addresses
gender discrimination." 88 Apparently, the Garcia court concluded that
same-sex harassment does not constitute discrimination based on gender.8 9
In Goluszek v. Smith,90 the decision upon which the Garcia court relied,
a federal district court departed from the traditional "but for" analysis of a

83. See Garcia, 28 F.3d at 452. Several courts responded to this message by following
the Garcia approach to the analysis of same-gender sexual harassment claims. See, e.g,
Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (relying on the
reasoning of Garcia and Goluszek to conclude that there was no evidence of an atmosphere
of oppression by a dominant gender); Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 803 F. Supp.
1, 4-6 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (stating that the intent underlying Title VII was to "establish equal
employment opportunities for women and not the type of conduct complained of by the
plaintiff' and refusing to "go beyond the ordinary and historical interpretation of Title VII to
fashion a remedy" for same-gender sexual harassment); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv.,
Inc., No. CIV.A. 94-1483, 1995 WL 133349 at *5-6 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 1995) (relying on
Garcia to hold that harassment of a male employee by a male supervisor does not constitute
sexual harassment under Title VII even though the harassing conduct may have sexual
overtones).
84. See, e.g., Murphy, supranote 37; see also Levay, supra note 19, at 1631 (stating that
pure gender discrimination is required by many courts, which demonstrates that the "but for"
test may be impossible to pass).
85. Garcia,28 F.3d at 448.
86. Id. The Garciaplaintiff also sued the plant manager and the company itself. Id. The
conduct of which the Garcia plaintiff complained included both physical and verbal abuse.
See id. The Garciaplaintiff alleged that on several occasions, his supervisor approached him
from behind and "reach[ed] around and grab[bed] [Garcia's] crotch area and ma[de] sexual
motions from behind." Id.
87. Id. at 451-52 (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil. Co., No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993)
(unpublished)) (alteration in original).
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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Title VII claim. 9' The Goluszek plaintiff brought a same-sex harassment
claim under a hostile work environment theory.92 The plaintiff alleged
harassment on the part of his male coworkers and superiors that created a
hostile or offensive work environment. 93 The court recognized that
Goluszek probably would not have been harassed but for his gender.'
Nevertheless, the court still chose to deny his claim under a different
theory.95 The Goluszek court, basing its reasoning on information and
opinions found in a law review article' rather than precedent, concluded
that upholding the plaintiff's claim would not further the congressional intent
underlying Title VII. 97 Despite the fact that the Goluszek plaintiff's claim
survived the "but for" test, the court decided that, in enacting Title VII,
Congress intended to combat an abuse of the imbalance of power that had
98
resulted from discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group.
Further, the court quoted a law review article stating that the type of sexual
harassment that is actionable under Title VII "'is the exploitation of a
powerful position to impose sexual demands or pressures on an unwilling but
less powerful person." '99 The court stressed that actionable sexual harassment is that which degrades victims by attacking their sexuality."°
Because the Goluszek plaintiff worked in a predominantly male
environment, the court concluded that an argument that it was an environment in which males were treated as inferior could not be supported.' l
Ultimately, the court stated that "Goluszek may have been harassed because
[according to the but for test] he was a male, but that harassment was not of
a kind which created an anti-male environment in the workplace.' ' 2 By
avoiding strict application of the traditional "but for" test for sexual

91. Id. at 1456.
92. Id. at 1453, 1455.
93. Id. Similar to the Garcia plaintiff, the Goluszek plaintiff complained of both verbal
and physical sexual harassment. Id. The Goluszek plaintiff endured verbal harassment, which
included taunting about his sexual activity. Id. On one occasion, a coworker told Goluszek
that he needed to "get married and get some of that soft pink smelly stuff that's between the
legs of a woman." Id. at 1453.
94. Id. at 1456.
95. Id.
96. See Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451-52 (1984).
97. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
98. Id. Other judges have argued that Congress did not intend to create an action for
same-gender sexual harassment in passing Title VII. See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d
1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress was not
envisioning same-sex harassment when it passed Title VII).
99. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456 (quoting Note, supra note 96, at 1451).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 9

harassment claims, the Goluszek court found same-sex harassment unactionable under Title VII. 13 The Garcia court adopted the Goluszek analysis
by stating that Title VII concerns gender discrimination and concluding
same-sex harassment is not actionable under Title VII °4
2.

Other Circuit Court Decisions

Within the past year, two Fourth Circuit decisions have spoken on the
H 05
issue of same-sex harassment under Title VII
In McWilliams v. Fairfax
6
County Board of Supervisors,' the Fourth Circuit relied upon a Garciatype analysis to invalidate a same-sex harassment claim.'0 7 In McWilliams,
a male plaintiff brought a Title VII harassment claim against his male
supervisor.'
Although the McWilliams plaintiff suffered both verbal and
physical abuse,' °9 fairly characterized as having strong sexual overtones, the
McWilliams court found that the "based on sex" requirement had not been
met." 0 In an abrupt disposition of the plaintiff's claim, the McWilliams
court stated that a Title VII harassment claim fails where "both the alleged
harasser and victim are heterosexuals of the same sex."'' . Under a plain
reading of Title VII, the court refused to apply the traditional "but for"
test."' Like the Goluszek court, the McWilliams court was concerned that
interpreting the language "based on sex" to include same-sex actors not only
exceeds congressional intent but also renders the Civil Rights Act unmanageably broad." 3 Curiously, the McWilliams court limited its analysis to cases
involving heterosexual harassers." 4 The court specifically reserved the
question
of whether same-sex harassment of a homosexual is "based on
115
sex."'

103. Id.
104. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 1994).
105. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 753 (4th Cir. 1996);
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1194-95 (4th Cir. 1996).
106. 72 F.3d at 1196.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1193.
109. Id. The plaintiff claimed to have been subjected to both physical and verbal sexual
harassment. Id. On at least three occasions, the plaintiff was allegedly tied up, blindfolded,
and forced to his knees. Id. A coworker then simulated sexual acts by placing his finger in
the plaintiff's mouth while another placed a broomstick to the plaintiffs anus and a third
exposed his genitals to the plaintiff. Id. Allegedly, the plaintiff also was verbally harassed.
Id. This harassment included an instance where a coworker flicked his tongue at the plaintiff
saying "I love you, I love you." Id.
110. Id. at 1195-96.
111. Id. at 1195.
112. Id. at 1196.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1195 n.4.
115. Id.
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Months after McWilliams, the Fourth Circuit again considered the issue6
11
of same-sex harassment in Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.
Like McWilliams, Hopkins involved a same-sex hostile work environment
claim brought by a male employee against a male coworker.117 After
examining the plaintiff's claim, the Hopkins court concluded that the
discriminatory conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to create an
118
environment that a reasonable man would find hostile or abusive.
Similar to that of the Goluszek court, the Hopkins court's statutory analysis
avoided treatment of Title VII as a sweeping regulation that would affect
everything sexual in the workplace." 9
The court opined that permitting a claim of same-sex harassment under
the Hopkins facts would open the floodgates to frivolous and uncontemplated
The Hopkins court therefore refused to allow the
Title VII claims.12
plaintiff's claim.'
However, in disposing of the claim, the Hopkins court
specifically disagreed with the analyses of courts such as Goluszek and
Garcia, which unequivocally stated that same-sex harassment is not
l
Rather than adopt Goluszek's conclusion, the
actionable under Title VII.22
Hopkins court stated that same-sex harassment may be actionable in
appropriate circumstances. 23 The Hopkins court qualified its statement by
adding that these circumstances must involve discrimination based on
gender. 24

116. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
117. Id. at 747. The Hopkins plaintiff claimed to have suffered both physical and verbal
sexual harassment. Id. The plaintiff alleged that a male supervisor attempted to kiss him in
the receiving line of the plaintiff's wedding. Id. The plaintiff also alleged incidents where
the supervisor squeezed past the plaintiff making comments such as "[y]ou only do that so you
can touch me" or "[w]as it as good for you as it was for me." Id. at 747-48.
118. Id. at 753. In this part of its analysis, the Hopkins court was focusing on the fourth
element to establish a hostile work environment claim. See supra text accompanying note 31;
see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982).
119. Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 749. In arguing that Congress did not intend Title VII to cover
same-sex harassment, the court stated that "the suggestion that Title VII was intended to
regulate everything sexual in the workplace would undoubtedly have shocked every member
of the 88th Congress, even those most vigorously supporting passage of the Act." Id.
120. Id. at 749-50.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 751.
123. Id.
124. Id. The Hopkins court included sexual preference and unpopularity among its
examples of reasons for harassment that would not be entitled to Title VII coverage. Id. at
751-52. In its analysis, the Hopkins court further stated that "Title VII imposes no gender
restriction for the person effecting the discrimination." Id. at 751. The court reached this
conclusion by stating:
While it is apparent from the historical record that Congress, in prohibiting sex
discrimination, meant to prohibit discrimination only on the basis of the employee's
status as a man or a woman, it is also clear from the statutory language itself that
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After Hopkins, it is clear that at least one circuit would be willing to
allow a same-sex harassment claim under limited circumstances. In these
instances, the victim must have been harassed on the basis of the victim's
existence as a man or a woman, rather than for reasons such as unpopularity
or sexual preference.'25 However, because the Hopkins court provided no
guidance as to circumstances under which it would find a same-sex claim
actionable, 2 6 the issue remains unclear in the Fourth Circuit. Furthermore,
the only other Fourth Circuit decision interpreting a same-sex harassment
27
claim employed a Garcia-type analysis to invalidate a same-sex claim.
B.

Courts Allowing Same-Sex Claims

The most recent circuit court decision on the issue of same-sex
harassment departed from the approach of Garcia and Goluszek to uphold
same-sex harassment as a viable Title VII claim.'28 Significantly, Quick
v. Donaldson Co.' 29 overturned a district court decision that rejected a
same-sex claim under Garcia.3 ' Condemning the interpretation by the
courts in Garcia and Goluszek of Congress' intent, the Quick court chose to
follow the traditional "but for" analysis. 3 '
In Quick, the reviewing district court concluded that "Title VII protects
a male employee from discriminatory sexual harassment only where he can
show an anti-male or predominantly female environment making males a
disadvantaged or vulnerable group in the workplace.' 3 2 Further, the lower
court concluded that "only discrimination of a sexual nature" is covered by
Title VI. 133 The circuit court rejected the lower court's Garcia/Goluszek
analysis and posited its own theory about the congressional intent underlying
Title VII.' 34 The Quick court held that Title VII prohibits workplace sex
discrimination regardless of whether the victim is part of a minority
group. 35 This interpretation is in direct contrast to that of the Goluszek

only the sex of the employee is relevant in determining whether Title VII is
implicated. [For this reason, Title VII] ...prohibits discriminatory conduct by an
"employer," regardless of the employer's gender ....

Id.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133
134.
135.

See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
See Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 751.
See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1379.
Id. at 1375-76.
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1377.
Id.
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court, which stated that Congress' intent in enacting Title VII was to combat
a societal imbalance of power by protecting discrete and vulnerable
17
no
groups.' 36 Because the Quick court rejected this interpretation,1
13
required.
was
environment
showing of an anti-male work
The Quick court stated that being a member of a protected class in a
hostile work environment claim requires only being male or female, not
being a member of a discrete and vulnerable group, as stated in Garcia and
Goluszek.'39 The Quick court interpreted the term "sex" in Title VII to
mean "either 'man' or 'woman,' and to bar workplace sexual harassment
against women because they are women and against men because they are
men."' 40
In Quick, the court expanded on the analysis in Meritor,141 the first
case to allow sexual harassment claims under Title VII, which had stated that
"[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual
advances were 'unwelcome.' ' 142 The Quick court would allow a broad
range of conduct to qualify as unwelcome advances, including both verbal
and physical abuse. 143 Under the "based on sex" element of a hostile
environment claim, the Quick court accepted a traditional "but for" analysis
inquiring whether "'members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms ... to which members of the other sex are not exposed."" 44
V.

THE FUTURE OF SAME-SEX CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII:

A CRITIQUE OF RECENT CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS

To date, the split among federal courts on the issue of same-sex
harassment endures. 45 Courts that recognize same-sex harassment claims
differ in their reasoning. 4 Courts that refuse same-sex claims do so based

136.
137.
138.
139.

See Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377.
Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377.

140. Id. (citation omitted).
141. Id.
142. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (citation omitted).
143. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377-78.
144. Id. at 1378 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993).
1995)
145. See, e.g., Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (C.D. 11.
(holding that same-sex harassment is prohibited by Title VII); Prescott v. Independent Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (accepting a quid pro quo claim
for homosexual harassment as within the purview of Title VII); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F.
Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (denying a same-sex claim on the ground that such a claim was
not intended by Congress).
146. See, e.g., Quick, 90 F.3d at 1380; Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745,
751 (4th Cir. 1996).
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upon differing theories of congressional intent.'47 Upon review of the
defects in the analyses of these federal courts, this author proposes a uniform
approach to the issue.
A.

Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America

The reasoning in Garcia and Goluszek is flawed in several respects.
Adopting the analysis of Goluszek, the Garcia court announced that "Title
VII addresses gender discrimination," not same-sex claims.'4 8
The
Goluszek court earlier had stated that same-sex claims should not be
actionable because they do not further the congressional intent of Title
VII.' 9 A close reading of these decisions illustrates that these arguments
are untenable.
In Goluszek, the court recognized that the plaintiff may have been
harassed because of his gender, 50 but nevertheless held that his claim was
not cognizable under Title VII."' By conceding that the plaintiff was
harassed because of his gender, the Goluszek court essentially conceded that
the plaintiff was a victim of gender discrimination. Through application of
a traditional "but for" analysis, this is the conclusion that precedent cases
would have dictated. 5 2 The Garcia court, in turn, stated that same-sex
harassment is not actionable because Title VII protects against gender
discrimination.'5 3 This argument seems untenable when viewed in light of
the Goluszek analysis, which acknowledged discrimination based on gender,
but chose to deny the plaintiff's claim for other reasons." 4
In its analysis, the Goluszek court ignored the traditional "but for" test
and based its decision on the supposed congressional intent of Title VII, as
stated in a single law review article.155 As discussed earlier, the sole
reason for the split among the federal courts is the absence of legislative
history on the adoption of the "based on sex" language in Title VII.'" By
basing its holding on one author's hypothesis of the congressional intent, the
57
Goluszek decision provides a weak foundation for subsequent courts.
147. See, e.g., Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.

148. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 1994).
149. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. See cases cited supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
153. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 452.
154. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.

155. Id.; see also Note, supra note 96, at 1451-52.
156. See supra notes 8 & 11 and accompanying text.
157. For a discussion of the absence of clear congressional intent in regard to the term
"sex," which was added at the last minute to Title VII, see 110 CONG. REC 2581 (1964); see,
e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84);
Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1381 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996) (Nangle, J., dissenting);
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Therefore, Garcia adopted the ill-founded reasoning of a lower court. As
commentators have noted, Garcia created a forceful precedent as the first
58
circuit court to speak on the issue of same-sex harassment. 1
An alternative argument may exist to strengthen admissibility of the
Goluszek plaintiff's claim. A reading of the Goluszek facts indicates that
Goluszek was harassed on the basis of his sexual preference." 9 Accepting
the court's argument that decisions in same-sex harassment cases should be
based, not on rigid "but for" tests, but on congressional intent," ° it is
possible to argue that Goluszek's claim should be accepted. The Goluszek
court stated that the intent of Congress in passing Title VII was to combat
an abuse of an imbalance of power resulting in discrimination against a
discrete and vulnerable group. 6 ' If homosexuals were accepted as a
vulnerable minority group, congressional intent would be furthered by
redressing the societal imbalance of power faced by those of a minority
sexual preference.
B.

Quick v. Donaldson Co.

In Quick, the plaintiff was taunted about being homosexual. 62 He
experienced both verbal and physical assaults from male coworkers during
his employment. 63 Although the Quick plaintiff worked in a predominantly male environment, the Quick court noted that other men in the environment were similarly harassed and female coworkers were not.164 Under the
Quick analysis, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the treatment of men
65
in his workplace was worse than the treatment of women.
The Quick majority's analysis was criticized by the dissent for interpreting Title VII too broadly."6 The dissent followed the reasoning of the
McWilliams court, which was modeled after Garcia.167 The Quick dissent

WHALEN & WHALEN, supra

note 9.

158. See, e.g., Lisa F. McEvers, Comment, Civil Rights - Work Environment; Sexual
Harassment: "Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor of the Same Sex, Is It Actionable?, " 72
N.D. L. REV. 397, 406 (1996) (stating that although the weight of Garcia has been disputed
by some courts, many have relied heavily on both Garcia and Goluszek when finding
same-sex harassment claims invalid under Title VII).
159. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1454.
160. Id. at 1456.
161. Id.
162. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1374.
163. Id.

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1380.
167. Id.; see also McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196
(4th Cir. 1996) (choosing not to extend the "but for" language to cover cases of same-sex
harassment due to practical implications).
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concluded that the majority's interpretation of Title VII misconstrued the
term "sex" as "'in matters of sex,"' thereby overextending the reach of Title
VII. 168 Further, the dissent criticized the majority for relying on early
Eighth Circuit cases that dealt not with same-sex harassment claims, but with9
6
traditional harassment cases with male harassers and female victims.'
The dissent noted that in these cases there was a presumption of harassment
under the "based on sex" element when women are harassed by men. 70
In sum, the primary difference between the majority and dissent in Quick is
that the majority would send the issue of same-sex harassment
to a jury,
71
while the dissent would decide the issue as a matter of law.'
Although the Quick court's analysis was more coherent than that of
Garcia,the Quick court left the issue whether Title VII protected homosexual
victims unresolved. 72 The Quick court expanded the holdings reached in
earlier sexual harassment cases that involved male harassers and female
victims to the same-sex harassment situation. 73 By adhering strictly to the
recognized "but for" test enunciated in earlier cases, the Quick court's
analysis is more convincing than the Garcia approach, which was solely
based on an interpretation of congressional intent argued in a law review
article. 174 However, the Quick court failed to adequately articulate the
viability of a same-sex harassment claim initiated by a homosexual victim.
C. A Better Approach?
The reasoning of cases such as Hopkins, Quick and Garcia, in which it
was held that Title VII covers gender discrimination but not sexual
preference discrimination, is vulnerable to criticism. The Hopkins court
concluded that Title VII does not prohibit conduct based on an employee's
sexual preference because such conduct is not aimed at the fact that the
employee is a man or a woman. 175 Reasoning that the "based on sex"
language of Title VII requires only that the employee be a man or a woman,
the Hopkins court concluded that Title VII does not reach discrimination for
other reasons. 76 This proposition is susceptible to criticism because the
nature of discrimination based on gender may necessarily entail that the
discriminatory conduct somehow be related to the victim's sexuality.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Quick, 90 F.3d at 1380 (quoting McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196).
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 128-40.
See supra text accompanying note 164.
See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751 (4th Cir. 1996).
Id.
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Consider two situations involving discriminatory conduct directed against
an employee. In the first example, a female employee is harassed by a male
employer. On one occasion, the female employee alleges that her supervisor
approached her from behind and grabbed her crotch area, making sexual
motions from behind her.177 The female employee also claims that her
supervisor asked her if she had had sex lately, telling her that she should
make use of that "soft smelly pink stuff' between her legs. 178 The supervisor went on to show her pictures of naked men, telling her that they could
get her "fucked," and the supervisor proceeded to poke her in the buttocks
with a stick.' 79
Under these circumstances, presumably most courts would find that this
conduct constitutes sexual harassment under Title VII. These courts would
most likely conclude that this conduct is pervasive enough to create a hostile
work environment.s ° In fact, this is the common scenario that springs
easily to the minds of most people when conceptualizing an instance of
sexual harassment.
For the second example, suppose the same set of facts regarding the
discriminatory conduct. However, in this instance, the conduct is directed
against a male employee by a male employer. Although the male employee
is subjected to the same set of circumstances as the female employee, some
courts would rule that the conduct does not constitute sexual harassment
under Title VII.181 This difference in outcome is illustrative of the most
difficult problem associated with the issue of same-sex harassment.
Presumably, courts would rule differently in the second example because they
would find that the discriminatory conduct was not "based on sex" as
required by Title VII. For example, the Goluszek court would refuse to
honor the same-sex claim in the second example because same-sex
harassment cannot be based on sex in the instance of male-on-male
harassment.' 2 In contrast, the McWilliams court might accept a same-sex
harassment claim as long as the court was convinced that the harassment was
based on sex, and not on the perceived sexual preference of the victim. 3
The courts that have reviewed the issue of same-sex harassment have
painted an unclear picture of the types of conduct that Title VII does and

177. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating the facts
upon which this hypothetical is based).
178. See Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1453 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating the facts
upon which this hypothetical is based).
179. See id. at 1454.
180. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
181. See, e.g., Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456 (concluding that same-sex harassment by
a male employer did not violate Title VII).
182. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
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does not cover. The case of harassment based on the actual or perceived
homosexuality of the victim presents the most difficult problem in allowing
same-sex harassment claims. Asking whether a victim would have been
harassed "but for" the fact that he or she is a man or woman does not seem
to adequately address the issue in these cases. For example, in Quick, the
harassment that the victim experienced was clearly pervasive and had sexual
overtones. 184 However, if the Quick court had determined that such
treatment was doled out to both women and men on an equal basis, the
conduct would not have constituted sexual harassment for Title VII
purposes. 8 5
Whether a victim is actually homosexual should be irrelevant in the
analysis of such circumstances. The actual status of the victim, in terms of
sexual preference, should play no part in the analysis of a Title VII claim
because the focus for such a claim is the harassment itself. Courts, in
keeping with the general intent of Title VII to prevent discrimination, should
not be asking what the victim did to deserve such harassment. Rather, courts
should be examining the conduct to determine if such harassment falls under
a relevant Title VII provision. The basis of such conduct generally can be
inferred from the conduct itself, rather than from the status of the victim.
For example, the experiences of the McWilliams plaintiff were characterized
by both physical and verbal abuse.' 6 The McWilliams plaintiff was, on
three occasions, tied up, blindfolded, and forced to his knees while coworkers
simulated sexual acts, exposing one coworker's genitals to the plaintiff and
placing objects against the plaintiff's anus. 7 The McWilliams plaintiff
also was verbally harassed by coworkers.'88 Because both the plaintiff and
his harassers were male, the McWilliams court refused to allow the plaintiff's
claim under Title VII.1 9 However, when objectively viewing the nature
of the discriminatory conduct to which the McWilliams plaintiff was
184. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996). The Quick plaintiff "was
the workplace victim of 'bagging,' physical assault, and verbal harassment, including taunting
about being homosexual." Id. at 1374. The court explained that "bagging" had been defined
as "the intentional grabbing and squeezing of another person's testicles." Id. As a result of
the "bagging," the Quick plaintiff experienced swelling and bruising of the testicles and
suffered continual bobbing sensations in one testicle. Id. at 1375. The plaintiff's coworkers
also placed tags on his equipment and belongings referring to him as a "Pocket Lizard Licker"
and "Gay and Proud." Id.
185. See id. at 1374. The record in Quick contained no evidence of female employees also
being "bagged" or suffering verbal harassment similar to that experienced by the Quick
plaintiff. Id. The court incorporated this assumption that only male employees suffered such
discrimination into its analysis. Id.
186. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1193 (4th Cir.
1996).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1195-96.
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subjected, this outcome seems inequitable. If the McWilliams court had
focused on the nature of the harassing conduct and the resulting environment
that the discrimination caused, the outcome would have differed, and the
intent of preventing discriminatory conduct under Title VII would have been
furthered.
In this sense, the Quick court's conclusion that the gravamen of a sexual
harassment claim is that the advances were "unwelcome" 1" is most
persuasive. However, unlike the Quick court, future courts should place less
emphasis on the "but for" test and concentrate more on the nature of the
harassing conduct itself. This focus would prevent courts from placing too
much focus on the victim and instead, allow courts to concentrate on the true
issue in these same-sex harassment cases, that is, whether the plaintiff was
subjected to unwelcome sexual advances that created a hostile work
environment.
VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The split among federal courts on the issue of same-sex harassment
continues. The only possibility of resolution will be the eventual review of
a same-sex claim by the Supreme Court or the passing of new legislation by
Congress to further explain its intent in adding the term "sex" to the Civil
Rights Act. Until either of these changes occur, courts will continue to
struggle with what "based on sex" means, and plaintiffs like the plaintiff in
McWilliams will continue to be denied the right to assert a Title VII claim
to end their harassment.

190. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377-78.
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